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Criminal Law-Use of Evidence of Prior Offenses in Fixing Discretionary Penal-
ties-[llinois].-Defendant was found guilty by a judge sitting without a jury. As
provided by an Illinois statute, the judge in fixing the sentence examined "witnesses
as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense," and heard oral testimony as to
the defendant's conviction of a similar crime fourteen years before. [Ill. Smith-Hurd
Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 38, § 732.] On appeal the judgment was reversed on other
grounds; but in a separate opinion by three of the seven justices it was stated that a
judge, in examining witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense, was
restricted by the "rules of evidence of any other inquiry." People v. Serrielle, 354 Ill.
182, 388 N.E. 375 (I933).
It is a general rule that evidence of previous offenses by the defendant is inadmissi-
ble at a trial, since it becomes a basis for an argument from defendant's general charac-
ter to the specific crime of which he is now accused, and is of relatively low probative
value. I Wigmore, Evidence (19o4), §§ 215-216. An exception exists where the previ-
ous offenses are related to the subject matter of the present trial in such a way as to
show a unified plan or scheme; i.e., where the evidence is valuable for other than the
character argument. I Wigmore, Evidence (r9o4), § 392. Once a verdict of guilty is
reached, however, the objection to the introduction of such evidence would seem to
disappear, since it is no longer being used in establishing defendant's conduct on a
specific occasion.
The great majority of jurisdictions permit the judge to consider evidence of prior
offenses in fixing a discretionary punishment. Peterson v. U.S., 246 Fed. 118 (C.C.A.
4 th 19I7), certiorari denied 246 U.S. 661, 38 Sup. Ct. 332, 62 L.Ed. 927 (i9x8);
Sharp v. U.S., 55 F. (2d) 227 (C.C.A. 4 th 1932); State v. Walter, 178 Iowa iio8, 16o
N.W. 821 (1917); People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N.W. 1i (1923); Booth v.
State, 122 Neb. 544, 24o N.W. 753 (1932); Fink v. State, 40 Ohio App. 431, 178 N.E.
700 (193i); State v. Wise, 32 Ore. 280, 5o Pac. 8oo (1897). In People v. Mansi, 129 App.
Div. 386, 133 N.Y.S. 866 (i9o8) unsworn testimony that the prisoner's portrait was
in the rogue's gallery was admitted on the ground that the ordinary rules of evidence do
not apply in such inquiries after a verdict.
The present case and three other very recent decisions indicate that the Illinois law
as to the use of such evidence is quite unsettled. The majority view, permitting the
consideration of previous crimes, was adopted in People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177
N.E. 739 (1931). In April, 1932 the Illinois court again followed the majority view:
People v. McWilliams, 348 Ill. 333, i8o N.E. 832. Two months later, ignoring both the
McWilliams and Popescue cases, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the contrary rule
that evidence of previous offenses was not admissible in fixing the sentence. State v.
Corry, 349 Ill. 122, i8i N.E. 6o3 (June 1932). The courtmayhave been in part swayed
by the fact that the defendant was but fifteen years of age. The dictum of the principal
case follows the Corry case, without citing it.
Statistics support the general supposition that a habitual criminal is more likely to
commit crimes in the future than the person who is a first offender, the likelihood of
future offenses increasing with the number of past crimes. Glueck and Glueck, Five
Hundred Criminal Cases (1933), 250-251; Bruce, Harno, Burgess, Landesco, Parole
and Indeterminate Sentence (1928), 224-225. In fixing the extent of the punishment
the court might well make a distinction between those who are, and those who are
not, likely to repeat the offense upon release. To do this the judge must have evidence
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of past offenses. Though the crime in the present case, committed fourteen years be-
fore, should perhaps be given little weight, to deny the judge the privilege of consider-
ing it altogether would be unnecessarily depriving him of valuable information in
exercising his discretion in the fixing of the penalty.
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Equity-Suit upon Foreign Decree for Alimony-Enforcement by Contempt Pro-
ceedings-[Minnesota].-The plaintiff, having been awarded alimony in a divorce ac-
tion in South Dakota, sought to recover the accrued alimony in an equitable suit in
Minnesota, and asked, that the decree make provision for enforcement by contempt.
The trial court, having found that the plaintiff's legal remedy was inadequate because
the defendant persisted in making salary assignments to his wife, rendered a decree for
payment of the accrued alimony, and provided for enforcement of the decree by con-
tempt proceedings. Held, decree affirmed. Ostrander v. Ostrander, 252 N.11. 449 (Minn.
1934).
If the amount of accrued alimony may not be affected by the court awarding the
decree, action upon it is usually permitted in a foreign court. Mayer v. Mayer, 154
Mich. 386, 117 N.W. 89o (i9o8); Williamson v. Williamson, 169 App. Div. 597, 155
N.Y.S. 423 (i9,5). Where the legal remedy is inadequate, and there is no affirmative
objection, such action should be permitted in a court of equity. Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (4th ed. i918), § 22o. The court in the principal case, having concluded
that the plaintiff's legal remedies were inadequate [see McClintock, Adequacy of In-
effective Remedy at Law, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 233 (1932)], provided for enforcement of
the decree by contempt proceedings on the ground that the case came within the
terms of a statute permitting the use of such proceedings "in all cases where alimony
or other allowance is ordered or decreed to the wife or child." Mason's Minn. Stat.
(1927), § 8604. Under a similar statute a Michigan court came to the opposite and
perhaps justifiable conclusion that the statute did not refer to decrees of foreign courts.
Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, ii7 N.W. 89o (ioo8).
It is believed, however, that the same result as in the principal case could have been
reached independently of the statute. One of the inherent powers of a court of equity
is to enforce its decrees by the process of contempt. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(4 th ed. i9r8), § 1433. A state, however, may place certain limitation upon this power.
It has been held that statutes making available common law execution for the enforce-
ment of equity decrees restrict the equity court's attaching power to those cases where
the remedy by execution has been exhausted, or where it would be futile to pursue it.
Klinek v. Borkowski, 259 Mich. 383, 243 N.V. 313 (1932), note, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 731
(1933); Harris v. Elliott, 163 N.Y. 269, 57 N.E. 406 (I9oo). The majority of jurisdic-
tions, however, hold that such a statute merely creates an additional method of en-
forcing an equitable decree. llriglztman v. TVigltman, 45 Ill. 167 (1867); White v. White,
233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919). The Minnesota divorce statute provided for se-
questration, but such process would have been futile in the principal case. Cf. People
v. Wagner, 117 Misc. 526, i91 N.Y.S. 697 (1921).
It is generally held that the usual constitutional guarantee against imprisonment for
debt restricts the power of a court of equity to enforce its money decrees. Caughlin v.
Ehbert, 39 Mo. 285 (i866); People v. Pape, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N.Y.S. 414 (1930);
Brierhurst Really Co. v. Lambrecht, 299 Pa. 9, 149 Atl. 863 (1930). A minority of courts,
